

Too little to complain:

The voice of Africa at the WTO

(A comparison of WTO complainant countries and African WTO members)

Abstract: The main drive force behind the inception of World Trade Organization (henceforth WTO) has been to strive an ideal of free trade. Free trade is a principle to which the WTO member countries should adhere so that trade barriers are transparent and reduced. The WTO provides many facilities to its member countries in its strive. One of them is to function as an authority to deliver a trade justice in the form of Dispute Settlement Unit. The member countries, which perceive a breach of multilateral trade agreement, are able to file a complaint at the WTO. While more than forty African countries are WTO members, none of them have so far raised their voice against any of their trade partners for a violation of a trade agreement. The two African nations found themselves subject to the complaints lodged against them. Each of them with four complaints are respondents in eight WTO complaint cases. These cases are described and analysed. The study probes into the possible reasons why the voice of Africa is not heard at the WTO platform in terms of complaints lodged by them. Is it because they have a too little share of the world market?

The current literature lacks the studies linking WTO complaints and the macro economic structure and vital trade indicators. It concludes that there are some correlational differences. The constructed index shows that the combined share in the world export and import is large enough to have made complaints.

JEL classification: F13, F14, F51, F69

Introduction:

What do the countries such as Nicaragua, Vietnam, Moldova, Singapore, USA, Norway Hungary, or Chile have in common? One of the few things, which these countries share, is that they are members of World Trade Organization, the WTO. Another feature related to their WTO membership is that they have been actively indulged in complaining at WTO forums about perceived trade barriers by their trade partner country. With this active participation in their strive expressed in the form of WTO complaints they form a bunch of more than forty odd countries spread across the various continents. That is another common feature of these countries: these countries do not belong to the African continent. There are more than forty African nations, which are WTO members. None of them have ever complained. This being the case two African countries have been complaint against by their trading partners; to date there are in total 8 complaints being filed against two African countries namely Egypt and south Africa.

Since its inception in 1995 until today there are more than forty African states members of World Trade Organization WTO. Countries ranging from Gambia to Madagascar and from Gabon to Nigeria are among the WTO member countries. One of the goals of the WTO is to ensure free trade, and provide the member countries facilities to ensure the free trade. For that purpose the member countries can use the WTO platform to lodge the complaints to ensure the commitment to free trade or trade according to an agreement. Africa, the second most populous continent with the total

population of over one billion has an approximately share of 2, 65% in the total world export and approximately an estimated share 2,52% in the total world import.

To lodge a complaint against a trading partner in case of breach of an agreement or in other valid reasons is expected, it is a platform open to WTO members. The non-complaining voice of Africa is striking because various trade organizations have been pointing out at the negative effects which trade has on the African continent. The African farming goes more by the rules of nature rather than the technological sophistication. That makes for them very difficult to get an access to a European market for farm products which has rules for product standards and prescriptions for product specification. The use of agricultural technology would imply a huge money investment beyond the reach of almost all the farmers.

The EU standards are considered as very stringent and too high than the normally accepted world standards. The various studies have provided estimates about the required investment which the poor farmers need to take if they were to fulfill EU standards, or the loss of income which they have faced when there was a ban.

A high level panel “Commission for Africa”, established by the then prime minister of UK Tony Blair, estimates in its report that if the EU were adhering to the international standards on pesticides on bananas, moving away with its more restrictive standards, the annual African exports would increase by \$400million.

The EU is aware of the protests and blames from different corners, a statement of the commissioner for health and consumer protection, Mr. David Byrne, agrees to it but maintains that SPS measures are not intended to block trade, but to safeguard the region's health standards. This dichotomy is captured correctly when South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel stated that:

“The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the needs and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of the rich.”

Apparently there is a discrepancy, because these alleged unfavourable trade consequences have not found their outlet on the WTO platform and expressed in terms of the WTO complaints, while the continent of Africa has been suffering from extremely stringent rules. The issue becomes more interesting given that more than half of the African WTO member country has EU as the first major import or export partner in terms of trade volume. In most cases EU ranks in one of the five most important trading partners. These EU rules should have been perceived by the trade partners in Africa. A distinction should be made here, it is not that the EU is committing a breach of an agreement but that they are keeping their high standards high. The economic standard measured in terms of gross domestic product does not really matter, otherwise the countries such as Nicaragua, Vietnam would not find themselves in the list of complainants. There could be many reasons for this silent potential economic power has not been able to find its way to protest against the various trade barriers market access to the WTO dispute settlement system but reduced to its essence it could be either because either these trade organizations and studies are taking the short term consequences as given and by building up the predictions more towards at the negative end, favouring more protectionism in the African countries. Or the trade organizations are right but WTO complaint procedure is too complicated. The WTO itself is aware of these and that is one of the driving factors to organize technological weeks every year for the WTO member countries.

The facility of a complaining platform open to the WTO members alone does not guarantee the use and access to the platform. Theoretically there are all the opportunities for a nation suffering from undesirable trade barrier consequences of its trade partner to raise the voice at the WTO platform. The practice shows that nations of all different characteristics have been making use of it but the African nations.


This paper studies the cause of this observed discrepancy from a different point of view. It is going to compare the set of African nations which are WTO members with the set of WTO member countries which are very active in terms of being complainants and being responsive at the WTO forum. The underlying assumption is that divergence within the various trade profile indicators between these two sets of WTO members should be able to provide some insight into the observed passiveness expressed in terms of lack of complaints at the WTO dispute settlement unit. The central question in this paper lauds

“To what extent does the WTO African members show divergence in the trade profile indicators from the WTO active members?” With this question this paper attempts to find out if there is any similar pattern to be found among various sets of WTO members. The operationalization of this central question and the research methods in explained in section two.

The following section, section two describes the methodology and data. The section three discusses and interprets the results. The final section, section four concludes with the scope for the further research.

The objective of the paper is to find out if and to what extent does this active group of WTO members differs from the African WTO members.

Literature and conceptual model:



The political economy theories supported by the studies conducted to predict and measure the impact of access to multilateral organization provides the direct and indirect support to the central proposition of this research study. The central proposition lauds that requested consultations are not independent of the sector profile indicators. This is in contradiction with the expectation of the multilateral organization as they

expect it to be. In other words the consultation requests are related to the sector profile indicators. The sector profile indicators in turn are outcomes of policy changes.

The conceptual model shows three links. The first link denotes the ideal situation; the way multilateral organization expects it to be. The ideal path for the requests for the consultations should be based on agreements. Elaborate measures, complex rules and the wide scale of information required to file a request for consultation makes sure that a party perceiving breach of an agreement fulfils all the necessary conditions is expected to ensure the independence status of the consultation. It implies that they are not politicized and do not have any political motives. The publicized documents and the rules on the website provide information which is updated regularly.

The second link is the lobby link which shows the influences on the decision making process. The authorities who are involved in this process are subject to influence through lobbies. The organized and unorganized sectors put pressures on the authorities to change the policies by making contributions. The roots of this link lie in the theory formed in their paper "For sale" Grossman and Helpman (1994, AR) proved theoretically a formation of lobby and its impact on policy. The "for sale" theory has subsequently been proven empirically by among others Subramanian and Wei (1999 AR), Gawande and Hui Lee (2000, AR).

The third link is related to the multilateral accession effects on the growth and structure of a given sector and the related policy. In 1999 Tong and Wei showed the increase of policy commitments and in growth rate of a sector as a result of accession. Accession also results in an increase in extensive and intensive margins (Balding 2011 IER). These increases affect downstream as well as upstream sectors as a result of accession.

Section two: Method and Data:


To prove this additional proposed link three empirically an exploratory study was conducted. It found out that Intellectual property right payments made by a country was highly correlated to the aggregate number of complaints made by the WTO active member countries. Furthermore the data show that more than forty African members are members of the WTO but have not filed a single complaint. This study is an attempt to probe into that question.

Given the theoretically and empirically proven lobby influence and the accession effect which clearly show that there are effects on the sector profile indicators as a result of multilateral accession, and that there are endogenous factors such as lobbies which affect the decision making process, the proposed study takes a step further. The existing literature does not provide yet any link between accession effects on sector profile indicators and the consultation requests. The proposed study wants to find out if that link can be proven and to test whether there is any link between sector profile indicators and the consultation requests.

Operationally central research question is reformulated as:

Q1. What is the difference between the active 30 and African 40 WTO members in terms of correlation pattern among the trade profile indicators.

The model of research design



The diagram shows the set of countries under purview. The research finds out if the results of 30 most active countries are also applicable to the sub group of seven nations. The seven complainants have not been exclusively complaining against these two African countries. A1 Those results hold true for the small subset of 7 seven countries until end 2012)

The study compare the non complainant group of 40 countries which are denoted by X1 and X2 countries.

There are three main components of the methods applied in this study. The first one is the comparison of the stepwise regression analysis of the active 30 WTO members against the African 40 members. The stepwise regression analysis will be carried out and the results will be compared and interpreted. The tested model for the WTO active countries is taken as the starting point..

Secondly, qualitative analysis of data for the countries which have been complaining against two African nations. It will be checked whether the pattern obtained from thirty WTO members also holds true for this small subset of seven nations. Apart from this the relevant data will be tabulated and ranked.

Thirdly, the comparative T statistics analysis will be carried out for a range of variability to compare the similarities and differences. The study uses comparative T statistics for the two sets of nations; one complaint and respondents 30 and another for 40 African WTO members for which the data are available; though a member of the DR of Congo is not included due to lack of vital data.

Given this regression and the emerging variables it is attempting to build an index to project the expected number of complaints which could have been filed at the WTO by the African WTO members. The t statistics comparison is carried out to provide an insight. The active group of WTO members should be divergent from the non complaining group to show that the results obtained for the WTO active countries are not random.

Secondly the comparison with the active member countries should be able to show the gap which still needs to be bridged by the African WTO members in terms of trade profile indicators.

Thirdly this study attempts to build an index of aggregate complaints that should have been at the WTO forums by the Africa continents.

This index is in initial stages and only the first steps of calculation is include.

The data:

In the regression analysis the number of complaints per country is not a valid dependent variable for the African forty countries. For this purpose a variable which has shown the most high correlation with the variable is replaces and taken as a dependent variable gross domestic product.

A varied odd set of more than twenty variables is collected from the trade information from among other WTO and World bank supplemented with other indices like transport performance and corruption index for the set of forty four 44 African nations which are member of WTO and for which the basic trade data is available. The varied range from population to the trade share split into the agriculture, manufacturing and service sector.

The data used is the secondary data as published on the website of the World Bank, WTO, United Nations and The heritage foundation.

The data used is the secondary data as published on the website of the World Bank, WTO, United Nations and The heritage foundation. The data available are 2012 in most of the cases it is 2012. The first step is the correlations if there are any two tailed significant correlation of 1 % or 5%. The second step is to carry out the regression analysis on these variables.

To sum up the methodology

- The bivariate correlation of all the variables, the list of which is summed up in appendix number four. Based on these results regression is carried out for all the stepwise regression using the significant variables for the 30 active countries including EU. The dependent variable being aggregate number of complaints.
- The study checks whether these results also hold true for the subset of 7 countries which are complainant for the African countries.
- The same equation is used for the African 40 WTO members. The dependent variable being gross domestic product.
- Comparison of T statistis with the variable which shows significance at 5% and 1% level
- The study constructs an index to project what the number of complants should have been had there been no unkonwn constraints.

Section three: Results: This section will give you an overview of the results obtained to the three areas

- 1) Are the results of the 30 countries applicable to the 7 complainants ;
- 2) What are the differences between 30 versus 40 Africans.
- 3) The 7 complaints of African countries analysis
- 4) The WTO complaint index

Are the results of 30 countries applicable to the 7 complainants.

This is in summary the result of 30 countries including EU

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	10,115	2,149		4,707	,000
IPR payments 30 countries	7,599E-10	,000	,926	10,091	,000

a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints 30

For the 30 countries the Intellectual property right payments which need to be made emerges out the single most important factor for the action , for the 7 countries a subset of the total 30 active countries which have been lodging a complaint and have been complained against show that the factor which

For the seven countries the FDI as a % of GDP emerges out as the single most explaining factor .

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	2,710	2,844		,953	,395
FDI %GDP	,000	,000	,992	15,285	,000

7 countries analysis only three variables found to be correlated , FDI as % of GDP, IPR payments and IPR receipts. In the stepwise regression analysis, FDI as % of GDP turn out to be the singular most important factor as a explaining to the respondents.

3.2: Regression: Number of respondents as dependent variable:

To compare the 30 WTO complainant against 40 African countries, it was necessary to use another dependent variable than the number of complaints. The correlation between number of complainant is very high with number of respondent cases. The number of respondent cases was used as the dependent variable. The next table shows the number of respondent cases model which shows the results of stepwise regression.

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
3	(Constant)	-,097	,031		-3,088	,006
	GDP mln current us currency	2,935E-05	,000	2,369	14,892	,000
	High Tech X Current	-1,140E-09	,000	-,419	-7,534	,000
	Share in total worldsM	-8,489	1,442	-1,094	-5,887	,000

a. Dependent Variable: No. Cases respondents Africa

For the African nations the GDP is positively related. The high tech current exports and the share in total world import turns out to be significant.

The respondent countries the GDP turns out to and the Intellectual property right turns out to be predictor For the 30 most active nations:

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate			
1	,932 ^a	,869	,862	9,852			
2	,951 ^b	,905	,893	8,646			
a. Predictors: (Constant), IPR payments 30 countries							
b. Predictors: (Constant), IPR payments 30 countries, GDP 30 countries							
Coefficients ^a							

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	8,230	2,368		3,476	,003	
	IPR payments 30 countries	8,824E-10	,000	,932	10,634	,000	
2	(Constant)	5,124	2,430		2,109	,051	
	IPR payments 30 countries	5,336E-10	,000	,564	3,353	,004	
	GDP 30 countries	2,954E-06	,000	,414	2,465	,025	
a. Dependent Variable: No. of respondents 30 countries							

3.3 Comparative means: The study compares the government spending between these two groups. An overview of T statistics is provided.

Variables	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
				Lower	Upper			
MFN tariffs agr. - MFN tariff Agr.goods	35,54667	54,44260	9,93981	15,21746	55,87587	3,576	29	,001
MFN tariff non agr. - MFN tariff non agr goods	14,67333	26,57300	4,85154	4,75081	24,59585	3,024	29	,005
Total trade registerd - No. Trademark registerd	-71428,83333	182314,37183	33285,89800	-139506,13859	-3351,52807	-2,146	29	,040
Share in total worlds X - X share in world	-1,45379	2,41529	,44851	-2,37252	-,53507	-3,241	28	,003
Share in total worldsM - M share in world	-1,61621	2,78622	,51739	-2,67603	-,55639	-3,124	28	,004
Govt Spending - Govt spending 28 countries	-14,28966	43,46884	8,07196	-30,82432	2,24501	-1,770	28	,088
Breakdown by commodity Agr. - Agr M share in 28 countries	4,49615	11,21426	2,19930	-,03338	9,02569	2,044	25	,052

All the variables displayed in the table are significant. The MFN tariffs for agriculture and non agriculture, are high.

3.4 Index.

The study has built an index as an exercise to find out the possible number of complaint for the African continent. The total number of complaints of the thirty WTO members is taken which is 434 divided by their total share of export in world trade. $434/59,03 = 7,35241$. By multiplying this outcome with the total export share of Africa 2,65, provides an outcome of 19,38. Indicating that

order that with this trade share in world exports the continent should have filed complaints approximately 20 times.

Discussion:

The seven complainants against Africa are active in general in the international arena and they have not been purely complaining only against the two African countries, Egypt and South Africa respectively.

The reason that why the active members complain The differences should be interpreted while keeping in mind that African group of WTO members is limited to the continent while the group of thirty active WTO members is much more diversified in terms of location. The non complaining group of WTO members is much bigger than this group of forty African countries. This paper will not cover the whole group of non complainants but takes a subset of the non complaints limited to the continent of Africa.

The noteworthy is the high correlation between the number of complaints and number of respondent cases. Apparently the trade fights are fought on the arena of trade forum of dispute settlement unit. These numbers are too systematically consistent and too high to be alone could be pure coincidental. That is the only consideration while taking number of respondent cases as depend variables.

The international trade involves basically export and import activities. The export brings the cash for import you have to pay cash. The government has to take many decisions which may or may not favour the industrial lobbies. The government may decide to lodge a complaint to show its support for the own industrial sector, to win the hearts and favours, may go for short term gains. If a country has to pay high amount of intellectual property rights it might be provoked to lodge a complaint against a country for the most provable trade complaint at the WTO forum which may or may not be valid.

The same cause and effect relationship would have been more insightful had there been some complaints lodged until the December 2013.

The study is at the aggregate level, the level high aggregation, the number of complaints ever lodged are all added up and correlated and regresses for the trade indicators data of for the year 2012. The reason to choose stepwise a regression was to look at the data

This because these alleged outcomes of the alternative trade organizations have yet to find its way to WTO platform in the form of complaints lodged by the African countries at WTO. There have been various reasons put forward for example the WTO entry criteria in the beginning were not strict, the liberalization was not necessary to be the effect of WTO entry. There are few sectors which are still sensitive and remain closed to the international trade. The study probes into the possible reason. The study postulates a proposition and examines it to form a conclusion and possibilities for future research. The proposition: the share of Africa in total world trade is too little to perceive the barriers this in combination with the absence of legal infrastructure and low government spending relative to other WTO active members handicaps them to complain at WTO

These are just a few examples that have come across, if the African trade partners are experiencing such trade barriers why have they not been able to express it at the WTO complaint forum. That is the question.

In an exploratory study of the 30 WTO member countries, which have been not only been complaining but also respondents, it is found that the trade complaints are related to three variables; namely structural unemployment, international property right payments and foreign direct investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). This paper attempts to find out if there is any similar pattern to be found among the African member states.

Nonetheless the two African countries, South Africa and Egypt have been responding to the trade complaints. It means that even though the members states did not complain they have been complained by other states and their roles have been that of respondent few details about that will be discussed briefly in the section three.

The calculations show that the share of import to and export from is too little as to complain for the continent as a whole but believe mentioned earlier less than 3% going to explore the three possibilities. This also takes into account the published studies by the fair trade organization and other nongovernmental organization such as CAFOD's, which shows that for e.g. EU trade policy, has wrought havoc among small-scale farmers in the economically less developed countries. We assume that there are reasons but not being able to complain for the lack of legal infrastructure and legal expertise.

UN integrated regional information Networks IRIN published in October 2012 discusses the way EU subsidies sour domestic milk industry or the risks of losing jobs of thousands in South Africa as a result of Chicken imports from the EU. Few of the key points of a report 2008 ODI are also mention worthy it states:

“There is no single 'African view' of what a development-friendly WTO compromise would look like. African countries benefit and suffer from subsidies, depending on their products and export markets African countries should prioritise their development needs and build alliances with other developing countries to present a united front.”

Without stepwise regression on the basis of give a best fitting model for the 30 active countries. The variation in this table when applied to the African nations would have provided some insights, but lack of that forced to figure out the resonas somewhere else. This table shows some interesting results, but these results could not variefied for the African nations.

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	5,924	1,875		3,160	,006
IPR payment	1,916E-009	,000	,735	3,883	,001
1 Structural unProblem	-,323	,148	-,231	-2,189	,043
FDI % GDP	,000	,000	,316	1,818	,087

a. Dependent Variable: No. of complaints

In total there have been eight complaints lodged against two African countries; namely South Africa and Egypt. Each of them is charged with four complaints.

Against South Africa the complaints have been lodged by; Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey. Brazil complaints pertained to the frozen meat of fowls, India's complaint is regarding to Pharmaceutical products ampicillin, amoxicillin, Indonesian complaint is about uncoated wood free white A4 paper and the Turkey complained is about blanketing in roles. Only the complaint of Indonesia is settled or terminated. The rest three are in consultation.

The data related to the importance of the product, which is being exported by the complainant country tabulated in annexure 1.

for India Pharmaceutical products are a major product of export, the 6th most important product. it is mentionworthy that India tanks in the first five major exporters to South Africa, while South Africa does not make it in the first five importers or exporters list of India. For the respondent South Africa this product tops in the first ten imported products.

All the four complainants have resorted to Anti-dumping agreement. (Article VI of GATT 1994):

Egypt, a respondent of four complaints. The complainants are Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and United States. For the last two complainant countries, Turkey and United States, ranks the list of first five major exporters as well as major importer for Egypt. For Turkey and United States Egypt does not score to the top five lists.

Pakistan's complaint was related to the Match boxes, Turkey's was related to Steel Rebar and USA complained for Textile and apparel products. The Complainant Thailand case is still in consolation and pertained to canned tuna in soya bean oil.

For Turkey and U.A. The products Steel Rebar and Textile and apparel products respectively do form the major product of export ranking in the top 50. For Egypt these two products also form the as the major import product ranking in top 50.

Brazil: the share of agricultural production in Brazil's exports has typically averaged around 25 per cent, although it climbed to 31 per cent in 2008. The agriculture sector serves as the backbone of Brazil's economy, with nearly 70 per cent of the country's land suitable for cultivation. Agriculture comprises approximately 6 per cent of Brazil's total GDP and accounts for more than 18 per cent of the country's total workforce (ILO Brazil) The product is includes in agricultural sector.

India for the exported product groups that have experienced high employment growth for the entire period of 1983-2005 Machinery, transport, Chemical and paper products were close second with employment growth between 3.5-4%(T.S. Papola, P.P Sahu 2012 ISID 2012)

Turkey: The cotton industry is important for the Turkish economy, the production and export showing high significance. For USA cotton industry is of vital importance too, ranking third in production after China and India. These are few details about the complainants described in short. As the explorative study has pointed out that the complaints may not be random but are related to the other economic factors in a country

Using government spending as a proxy variable for the number of complaints was an attempt to capture the strength of the government based on its spending and its effect on the. The first possibility that trade agreements are up to satisfactions and though some of WTO African member states are respondents, assuming that for rightfully, their trade partners have been keeping fully to the trade agreements. The result though the correlation between the number of complaints lodged with government spending among the complaining and responding nation is not very strong.

The government spending shows a very insignificant correlation with current account, FDI and other variables for both set of the nations and fails to serve as proxy for the 28 active WTO members. Likewise it shows no significance displayed in table 2 for the 40 African member states.

Geneva week is one of the important initiatives to cater to the needs of the relatively weak countries who do not have representation permanent WTO. Even if the majority of African WTO members have their permanent representation at WTO there are factors related to their inactive role and yet to be captured in the statistical significant equation.

The export share should have resulted into complaints but then the lack of enough funding and government spending should support. The mean government expenditure 50,2241 while for thirty nations 64,51398 mln. The WTO week for those who do not have representation shows that Most of the WTO member states except Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo have their permanent representation at Geneva.

The initiation of Technology box where the countries can combine and pool their resources at WTO says volume about the working and the position of the weaker nations and provides a further scope for the study. The study concludes that Free trade is not for Free for poor nations.

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Annexure 1:

Respondent	Complainant		status	product	Agreement cited on
South Africa	Brazil	1 case(s):	In consultation	Frozen meat of fowls	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994):
		DS439			
	India	1 case(s):	In consultation	Pharmaceutical products ampicillin, amoxycillin	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994)
		DS168			
	Indonesia	1 case(s):	Settled terminated	Uncoated woodfree white A4 paper	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994)
		DS374			
Turkey	1 case(s):	In consultation	Blanketing in roles	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994):	
	DS288				
Egypt	Pakistan	1 case(s):	settled	Match boxes	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994):
		DS327			
	Thailand	1 case(s):	In consultation	Canned tuna in SO.	GATT 1994: Art. I, XI, XIII Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS): Art. 2, 3, 5, Annex B
		DS205			
	Turkey	1 case(s):	Settled	Steel Rebar	Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994):

		DS211			
	United States	1 case(s):			Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994):
		DS305	Settled	Textile and apparel products	

Appendix 2

Respondent	Complainant	Respondent major Xer (first five)	Respondent major Mer(first five)	Complainant major Xer (first five)	Complainant Major Mer(first five)
South Africa	Brazil	N	N	N	N
	India	Y	N	N	N
	Indonesia	N	N	N	N
	Turkey	N	N	N	N
Egypt	Pakistan	N	N	N	N
	Thailand	N	N	N	N
	Turkey	Y	Y	N	N
	United States	Y	Y	N	N

Appendix 3

Respondent	Complainant	Product	Major Import product of Respondent	Major X product of complainant	
South Africa	Brazil	Frozen meat of fowls	N in first 100	N	Not settled
	India	Pharmaceutical products ampicillin, amoxycillin	Y / 6th	y/ 5th	Not settled
	Indonesia	Uncoated woodfree white A4 paper	N in first 100	N in 100* but most important producer of the product	
	Turkey	Blanketing in roles	N in first 100	Y/ 10/74 bed and tabel linen / Woven fabrics	Not settled
Egypt	Pakistan	Match boxes	N	N	

	Thailand	Canned tuna in SO.	N	N/ food preperationss 68	Not settled
	Turkey	Steel Rebar	Y/ 4th and 35 (iron and steel iron and steel > 600 mm wide-hot)	8/ 24 Iron & Steel Bars & Rods - HR/ Iron & Steel Bars & Rods - Irregular Coils	
	United States				
		Textile and apperel products	Y 63 / 68 Woven Cotton Fabrics > 85% > 200 G/M2/ cotton	N cotton 39	

The results: Bivariate correlations for 30 WTO active countries.

Variables	Expected sign	Parametric tests Level at 0,01 and 0,05% (30 countries)	Parametric tests Level at 0,01 and 0,05% (7 countries)	Non parametric tests Variable	Expected sign	Level at	Non Parametric tests Level at 0,01 and 0,05% (7 countries)
Total number of respondents		,650**	,984**	Total number of respondents		800**	
Gross domestic product		,528**	,895**	Gross domestic product		,703**	
Freedom from corruption		,381**	,919**	Freedom from corruption		,528**	
Unemployment rate	negative	-,407**		Unemployment rate		-,512**	
Import share in the world		,498**		Import share in the world		,680**	
Export share in the world		,538**		Export share in the world		,713**	
Numer of trade marks registration.		,574**		Numer of trade marks registration.		,765**	
IPR receipts		,612**	,975**	IPR receipts		,793**	1,000**
GDP/ Trade ratio	Negative	-,262*		HDI		,458*	
FDI as % GDP	Negative	-,302*	,989**	FDI as % GDP			,821*
Current account balance		Not significant	-,963**	Manufacturing share in imports	Negative	-,397*	
Property rights		Not significant	,916**				
IPR payments		Not significant	,984**	IPR payments		,446*	,810*

